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POSSIBLE NOUNS FOR VISUAL EXPERIENCES:
A THEORY OF THE VISION-LANGUAGE INTERFACE
ABSTRACT: The relation between vision and language is ana-
lyzed through a formal statement of what defines objecthood in
the two domains. An interpretation of independently-motivated
approaches to vision and to the grammar of nominals allows us to
define the connection between them as an “infomorphism” con-
sisting of two functions. Visual and linguistic objects are only in-
directly related: the functions range over types and tokens, whose
map defines objecthood in each domain. We show how the infer-
ences proved in this system are empirically correct, and we draw
some conclusions about the import of our proposal on the role of
language in cognition.
1. INTRODUCTION
Language is so fundamental in representing what we think, that a major
challenge for studies of cognition and conceptual knowledge is avoiding
the common pitfall of equating concepts with lexical concepts (Kelter
& Kaup 2012). Usually, the strategy for avoiding this pitfall consists
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in devising experimental tasks that bypass language and allow a direct
investigation of conceptual content independently of its verbalization
(Papafragou 2005). We explore here a different direction, and compare
the conceptualization of objects in language and in vision.
Our first aim is to make such a comparison possible in the first place.
This target is far from trivial, because “the conceptualization of objects”
is too vague a notion for investigation unless it is operationalized pre-
cisely enough to allow a comparison of different ways of defining ob-
jecthood. For that purpose we propose a formalization of the visual
and nominal conceptualization of objects in terms that have theoretical
and empirical justification by themselves (Sections 2 and 3), relying on
the extensive body of research made in these two intensely studied sys-
tems. The central aspect of our proposal is the formulation of a formal
system of correspondences between the two, based on the notion of
infomorphism (Barwise & Seligman 1997) and implemented by means
of two functions (Section 4). As we show in Section 5, this allows us
to formally derive, as necessary inferences, several different matches
between linguistically defined entities (nominals) and visually defined
ones (visual objects). Importantly, the formal inferences cover the ab-
sence of visual input or of recognized linguistic material, and above all,
they predict what correspondences are not definable.
We will show that these results are all empirically supported. As will
also become clear, our analysis does not need to impose an otherwise
unmotivated isomorphism between nominals and objects. Nominal lin-
guistic structures and objects of visual representations are commensu-
rable abstract entities thanks to our formal interpretation of indepen-
dently justified properties, not because we present them as parallel to
begin with. Still, while being neither isomorphic nor derived from each
other, vision and language emerge from our analysis as two represen-
tation systems whose interaction can be investigated in an empirically
verifiable and predictive way.
2. VISUAL OBJECTS: AN ONTOLOGY OF VISION
Our first goal is to outline an ontology of vision. We proceed in two
steps: we first discuss previous research on visual types allowing the
recognition of objects (Section 2.1), and then offer a formal treatment
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of the corresponding ontology (Section 2.2).
2.1. Visual Objects: Basic assumptions
The human visual system processes and segments the visual stream
into spatio-temporal units (Michotte 1963, Ullman 1979, Marr 1982,
10–34). These units can represent “objects” for “things” in the world, if
they are related to mental categories. Several sub-systems participate in
parallel to this process; their governing principles seem constant (Scholl
2009). Thus, even if shape and colour are types of information com-
puted by different sub-systems, a blue ball as an object can be defined
by integrating this information.
Models of object recognition abound, although they sometimes offer
opposing views as to how these processes occur. Here we take a compu-
tational view; we follow the Multiple Object Tracking framework of ref-
erence (Pylyshyn 1984, 34–40, 1989). In this model, discrete units of
sensory experience (“visual stimuli”) can be classified according to the
visual properties they realize. A visual stimulus is modeled as a token
or particular instance of a general category or type. Stimuli and prop-
erties stand in a token/type relation of instantiation. The visual index
for this relation representing mind-external objects is known as a Fin-
ger of INSTantiation or FINST (Pylyshyn 1989, 69; Scholl et al. 2001).
FINSTs act as “mental fingers” that instantiate objects, in turn repre-
sented as relations between a visual token and the types it instantiates
(e.g. “blue” and “ball” in our example). Beyond the Multiple Object
Tracking framework, FINSTs are known as object files (Kahneman et al.
1992; Zacks & Swallow 2007).
FINSTs/object files, thus defined as relations between tokens and
types, can become spatially and temporally stable in short-term memory
when they meet certain constraints: occupy connected positions (con-
nectedness), consist of elements mutually connected by a part-of rela-
tion (mereology), remain stable over time unless external changes oc-
cur (persistence), and never result in conflicting representations (con-
sistency) (see Scholl 2001, 2009). Observers can abstract complex cate-
gorial representations, which become stable units in long-term memory
over repeated exposure.
The object classes so defined are known as object concepts, and rep-
resent shared information about object files and their relations, stored
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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in long-term memory (Biederman 1987; Cowan 2005). For instance,
the “bicycle” object concept can correspond to a representation for any
object having certain key parts (two wheels, a frame) and functions
(use as a locomotion tool). Observers can use this tacit knowledge to
complete and update these representations. Thus, an observer witness-
ing a bicycle missing a wheel will still be able to recognize this object
as a bicycle (see Scholl & Pylyshyn 1999; Serre et al. 2005; Feldman
2007).
Works on possible visual types abound, and do not necessarily offer
a cohesive picture. Still, they provide extensive evidence that the clas-
sification process follows a type-driven principle. Examples of types
include textons, which include material constituency (e.g. a steel con-
tainer) and colour (e.g. a red ball: Julesz 1981; Zhu et al. 2005).
Shape types have also been studied in detail (e.g. Marr 1982; Bieder-
man 1987; Hummel & Biederman 1992; Riesenhuber & Poggio 2002).
Quantities or units are another type, and can be classified according to
their quantity (e.g. “nine” objects: Pietroski et al. 2009) or organiza-
tion. Thus, several dots moving in the same direction can also be indi-
viduated as a single complex unit or group (Scholl et al. 2001; Pylyshyn
2004, 2006; Mitroff et al. 2005).
Objects can also be individuated via their potential functions for a
subject in an environment, or affordances (Gibson 1966; 1979, Ch. 1;
Wells 2002; Withagen et al. 2012). Motion is also conceived as a visual
type that allows agents to identify objects against static backgrounds
(Ullman 2000; Gao et al. 2010; Scholl & Gao 2013). Affordances and
motion types are sometimes conceived as more “intensional”, or “higher
order” visual types (cf. Wells 2002; Scholl & Gao 2013). We focus
on these visual types as the starting points for such inferences, and
leave the discussion of inferences on non-visual information for future
research. Here, we proceeded by outlining a formal ontology of visual
objects.
2.2. Visual Objects: A formalization
Multiple Object Tracking theory offers a formal view of these notions,
although certain aspects are not fully developed (e.g. concepts). Here
we follow this formalization and expand on the aspects that are under-
developed, to pave the way for our proposal in Sections 4–5. Formally,
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a FINST/object file is defined as FINST(token,type)=d (Pylyshyn 1989,
75–76). The index d acts as an index (or “mental finger”) representing
the object as a relation between a visual token and the types it instan-
tiates. The next step is to define how we represent object concepts.
This aspect is usually underdeveloped in the theories discussed so far,
but can be made precise by implementing a structured type theory that
captures how visual types can be combined into complex types. Here
we adapt the core ideas of Type Logical Composition (Asher 2011).
A simple way to present how this theory works is as follows. A bi-
cycle can be conceived as an object that involves different parts with
different shapes and colours (e.g. a black frame, red wheels, and so
on). Thus, an object can be represented as a combination of parts that
can be recognized in their own right, but that also combine to form a
bicycle as a whole. Several works follow logic-driven, algebraic models
of representation to capture these facts with respect to one type of in-
formation, as we have discussed (e.g. Marr 1982, 225–230; Hummel &
Biederman 1992; Pylyshyn 2004). Type Logical Composition follows a
similar tack, and proposes a formal system to capture how these distinct
types are combined. A central aspect of this proposal is that this model
of types is identified with a Boolean Algebra. This algebra is defined
as a structure in which the three operations meet, join and negation
and the relation part-of are defined. To make the discussion maximally
transparent, we represent this and the other operations/relations by
representing how types can be applied to tokens.
The operation meet, represented via the symbol “u”, is defined as
an operation that takes types and returns their common type(s), de-
fined as “a(x)ub(x)”. Thus, blue(x)uball(x) is the meet of the visual
types that represent a blue ball, via a visual token x.1 The opera-
tion join, represented via “t”, takes types and returns their unified
type(s), defined as “a(x)tb(x)”. Thus, an ice-cream shape corresponds
to the join of two more basic shapes, that of a cone and a sphere: we
have cone(x)tsphere(x)=ice-cream(x). The operation negation “¬” is
defined as an operation that takes a type as an input and returns its
complementary type as an output. If a square is divided into two dis-
tinct parts, one black and the other white, then the colour type of one
part will be the complementary type of the other part. We thus have
black(x)= ¬white(x). The part-of relation “v” (i.e. “a(x)vb(x)”) is de-
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fined when the two identities “a(x)ub(x)” and “a(x)tb(x)” hold. That
is, type a is part-of type b if their meet is the (sub-)type a, and their sum
is the (super-)type b. A second relation is the identity relation. Two ob-
ject files are identical (i.e. we have a(x)=b(x)) if their meet and join
are also identical (i.e. we have a(x)ub(x)=a(x)tb(x)).
Let us now turn to object files. According to these definitions, an
ice-cream object file, call it b, can be defined as b=(cone(x)tsphere(x)).
An index b is identified with an instantiation relation between a visual
stimulus x and a join of two shape types, cone and sphere. A similar
analysis can be extended to meet types. For instance, a blue ball can
be defined as the object file d=(blue(y)usphere(y)). The object file d is
identified with a visual token y, instantiating the visual types blue and
ball at the same time, hence the use of the meet operation. For the role
of negation and the part-of relation in object files, we defer a discussion
when we will tackle the relevant examples.
Consider two object files for “balls”, d=(blue(y)usphere(y)) and f =
(red(z)usphere(z)). These files differ with respect to the colour they
instantiate, but both can stand as specific files related to the concept
of “ball”. In this case, we say that the colour type of the concept is
underspecified with respect to other types; one value assigned to a type
can be ambiguous in context (cf. Pylyshyn 2004; cf. Asher 2011, Ch. 3
for a linguistic definition). The shape type can also be underspecified,
since balls can come in different shapes, in football codes (cf. the oval
ball used in rugby). If d and f are the only two files acting as members
of the concept BALL, then this concept represents the class of spherical-
like objects of any colour.
A concept C can be extensionally conceived as the set of object files
instantiating certain properties. Thus, the object concept of red things
is the collection of object files o, o′, o′′,... individuated via the type red.
We represent object files via lower-case letters distinguished by super-
scripts. We represent concepts based on types by means of upper-case
letters. Thus, the concept “red” is represented as RED; {o, o′, o′′,...} =
RED is the relation stating that a concept is defined as the set of ob-
ject files of red type. In intensional terms, we represent concepts as
relational entities. We have o∈RED, with “∈” for the membership rela-
tion, to represent how concepts are formed with object files as building
blocks.
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The concept BALL can be represented as the join BALL=(SPHERE
t COLOUR), with SPHERE, the concept, derived from type of spheres,
and COLOUR being the complex (join) concept of all colour types (e.g.
we have col=redtgreentblue..., hence COLOUR=...). For the sake of
consistency, we employ the variant notion used in the literature on
Boolean operators to represent concepts (e.g. Landman 1991, Ch. 2–
4; Chierchia 1998 on kinds). We thus have CONCEPT =
⊔
file: an ob-
ject concept is the join of all files representing a given object type (e.g.
ball(x)tball(y)tball(z)).
Two key results emerge from this initial formalization. First, con-
cepts are defined insofar as abstraction from more than one file is possi-
ble. Beagle and dachshund are “types” of dogs defined via their common
characteristics (e.g. being four-legged) but also their differences (e.g.
size and coat). Our system proves that the concept DOG represents the
combination (union) of more specific objects or “variants” that qual-
ify as dogs because of their similar, and yet distinct visual types. Sec-
ond, FINSTs/object files internally represent mind-internal information
about mind-external “objects” in a bottom-up manner. Concepts can
develop and change over time via information obtained via new ob-
ject files (cf. Laurence & Margolis 1999; Margolis & Laurence 2007;
Murphy 2002, Ch. 2).
Overall, we have shown that the notions of objecthood, visual object
files and concepts support a conception of vision as a mediated process,
which starts from the classification of tokens (visual stimuli). The men-
tal ontology of visual objects reflects mind-internal principles regarding
how this information is processed and organized. Object concepts act
as mental objects that guide this classification process even if the visual
input involves apparently incomplete or underspecified information.
3. NOMINAL OBJECTS: AN ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE
Moving from the visual to the linguistic conceptualization of objects, we
meet an initial problem; semantically, objects are simply presupposed,
as a domain over which the denotation of linguistic expressions is de-
fined. For example, ball can be (and generally is) ultimately analyzed
as an expression true of balls, red of red things, and see of pairs of ob-
jects where one sees the other. A comparison with the visual system
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requires a different perspective, namely asking how language defines
and characterizes objects. While both pronouns and nouns categorize
the entities they denote (by means of gender and number features, for
example, or in terms of pragmatic role for some honorific pronominal
forms), it is specifically nouns that describe them and thus define an
ontology by linguistic means. Accordingly, we discuss the special role
nominals have in in representing types of entities (Section 3.1), and in-
dicate how linguistic determinations contribute to this representation
(Section 3.2). Finally, Section 3.3 interprets the definition of objects in
language in type-token terms that allow us to relate it to their definition
in vision.
3.1. Nouns and nominals as expressions for abstract types of entities
Nouns are one of the fundamental lexical categories, and so the ques-
tion of how they can define objects intersects the rich literature on the
content, definability, and universality of lexical categories (Croft 1991;
Baker 2003; Gil 2005; Bisang 2011; Panagiotidis 2014; among many
others). However we are not (directly) interested here in the possible
semantic latitude of nouns as a category of words, but more precisely of
nominals, understanding under this term single lexemes like wine, com-
plex structures like black hole or footwear, or phrases like good dancer
or a bottle of ordinary wine. Nominals in all of these ‘sizes’ define object
types.
This circumstance accords naturally with a theoretical approach
which views nouns (and all lexical items) as constructions organized
on the same principles that underlie syntactic constructions (see Borer
2005a, 2005b; Harley 2014; cf. Rijkhoff 2002 for a different approach).
Our proposal presupposes this theoretical perspective, and so sits most
comfortably within a non-lexicalist approach to morphology and syn-
tax; however, it does not strictly require this theoretical choice (which
will only be crucial for the interpretation of uninflected lexical bases as
existing linguistic objects, cf. 5.2 below).
On the other hand, a semantic assumption is central: that nouns
and certain nominals like red wine denote not just the mind-external
objects that they are true of, but also, and indeed primarily, an abstract
kind which they identify and name. We thus follow Krifka (1995) and
Zamparelli (2000) in assuming that nouns primarily denote an abstract
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kind, and are then specified by morphosyntactic determinations (like
number or quantificational expressions) which turn them into predi-
cates true of entities (see Acquaviva 2018 for details). It is in this sense
that nouns and nominals define object types, and are not just true of
already given elements of the domain. A noun like ball and a kind-
identifying phrase like red wine denote, then, a kind-level, abstract ob-
ject, which is part of their semantic interpretation and acts as an in-
termediary for the reference to one (for ball singular) among a set of
mind-external balls, or to a concrete portion/instance of red wine, or
possibly to the abstract kind ‘red wine’. This abstract object is part of the
hypothesized semantic interpretation, and in this sense it is a language-
internal construct; whatever its possible relation with a concept, it is not
here posited as a psychologically defined concept, in particular not as
the concept of an entity that exists in the ontology presupposed by the
speaker.
To see what this means, consider nouns like child or president: they
define roles, by definition not identical with individuals (if John is a
judge and a janitor he is not two people), and so the corresponding
kinds cannot identify individuals as members of the domain. However,
these roles too have individuality, in the sense that the approach we
follow reifies them as abstract sorts, on a par with a sort like the aver-
age American. We follow Collins (2017) and accept that this descrip-
tion denotes an abstract object which can be used as an argument of a
proposition that is true or false in the world (like The average American
has 2.3 children), even though by itself the object is abstract, does not
denote any concrete mind-external individual, and speakers are aware
of that.
3.2. Defining and characterizing kinds of objects
Nouns and nominals define and characterize objects insofar as they de-
scribe them in different possible ways. Home and house have largely
(not totally) overlapping extensions, but they characterize in different
ways what they are true of; a holiday house can be termed holiday home
to present it in a more attractive light, but the protective warmth asso-
ciated with home makes it unsuitable for use in, for instance, jailhome,
workhome or whorehome. These may look like ‘lexical’ differences that
do not affect the ‘grammatical’ identity of the two words (here, nouns)
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as linguistic objects. But the facts stand otherwise. Shadow and shade
or sun and sunshine exemplify pairs (not minimal) where the second
member strongly favours a reading where the denotation has the struc-
ture of an unbounded continuum, not a set of individuated wholes. The
point is that this distinction is made visible by a difference in syntactic
distribution; we are of course alluding to the contrast between so-called
mass and count, which is encoded in grammar and emerges as a distri-
butional asymmetry. The same happens, more sharply, with well-known
pairs like hair/ hairs and hair, or with the different readings of cloud/
clouds (a cloud, a few clouds) vs. singular mass cloud ‘cloud cover’ as in
European English there will be sunshine through broken cloud.
Differences in countability properties notoriously emerge across lan-
guages, highlighting different conceptualizations for nouns that would
otherwise seem to denote the same referents. The English grape/ grapes
describes a certain kind of fruit as a collection of berries; Italian de-
scribes the same fruit as uva, a singular noun with the mass syntax of
a substance term like acqua ‘water’. Similarly, what English describes
by the plural count noun peas is described in Russian by the singular
goroh, which has the syntax of a mass noun like many other denomi-
nations for what is seen as a granular substance (cf. also the Russian
singular luk ‘onions’). To describe a single pea, Russian has a derived
word, gorošina; this is however a distinct lexical item, with its own
plural gorošiny. So-called singulative derived nouns play a much more
central role in the grammar of languages like Arabic, where zahr ‘flow-
ers’ contrasts with the singulative zahra ‘(a) flower’, and the latter can
be pluralized as zahraat; in addition, the ‘plural’ base itself can be plu-
ralized in turn, as zuhuur or azhur.
In each of these forms a grammatical characterization identifies a
particular type of interpretation. As in a myriad other cases, grammar
affects the way a noun characterizes its denotation. Cross-linguistic
studies have extensively documented how semantic interpretation varies
as a function of different choices of number, gender, noun class, or clas-
sifier (Massam 2012; Senft 2000; Aikhenvald 2003) and we will not
attempt to summarize them here. What this evidence shows is that
nouns and complex nominals are not just true of objects whose nature
is given; languages characterizes the nature of these objects by distinct
lexical choices (home vs. house, wood vs. timber), by distinct complex
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structures (red wine vs. mulled wine), by distinct grammatical choices
(Swahili mi-ti ‘wood’, class 3 vs. ki-ti ‘chair’ class 7; Italian legno masc.
‘wood’ vs. legna fem. ‘firewood’). We therefore include all of these
language-internal representations as means to linguistically define and
characterize objects.
3.3. Types and tokens
The way language defines objects is thus very different from the way
vision interprets and categorizes visual stimuli. Our goal of examining
the relation between the two requires that they are made comparable,
but not by forcing an isomorphic structure on them. Our characteri-
zations of the definition of objects in vision and in language are both
independently supported by a rich literature, and obliterating them to
impose an isomorphic structure on both would strip the argument of its
empirical justification.
We therefore take a different approach. This section has already
spelled out our assumptions about the grammar and semantics of nouns.
Beyond that, there is no need to formulate and adhere to a particular
grammatical interpretation of the structure of nominals. However a
noun or a noun phrase is grammatically analyzed, it is possible to dis-
tinguish the structure in itself from the choice of morphemes or lexical
items (this depending on one’s assumptions about morphology) that
flesh it out. For example, assigning for simplicity a basic analysis as in
(1a) to the nominal the lazy dog, it is possible to abstract from it the
structure (1b), and to list as in (1c) the lexical/morphological material
that interprets it:
(1) a. [Det the [Adj lazy [N dog ]]]
b. [Det Det [DEFINITE, SG] [Adj Adj [N Noun [SG] ]]]
c. the, lazy, dog
Many questions remain open from a linguistic perspective: for in-
stance, whether the English grammatical morpheme the is entirely de-
termined by the features ‘definite’ and ‘singular’ (in fact, whether these
features are justified, since ‘singular’ could conceivably be [−plural], or
the default value in a privative feature). In that case, the would not be
selected among competing lexical choices in the same sense in which
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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lazy and dog are, because the featural content would entirely determine
its choice (in other words, the choice of ‘grammatical’ morphemes fol-
lows deterministically from the choice of features, unlike the choice of
‘lexical’ morphemes or lexemes). Likewise, the labels ‘adjective’ and
‘noun’ for lazy and dog could conceal a more complex structure where
lexical roots are grammatically categorized by a categorizing null for-
mative or as a function of their syntactic placement (see Borer 2005a,
2005b; and Harley 2014). Finally, the nature of dog as a singular count
noun is likely to be reflected in a finer-grained structure, which includes
a separate locus for number features and/ or for the determination of
countability. These and similar questions, no matter how substantive in
themselves, are irrelevant here. What counts is that we can distinguish
two types of linguistic representations of a grammatical object, both of
them abstract. (1b) is abstract because it simply represents a template
for a type of linguistic object, not yet realized by any morpheme choice
to interpret it. But (1a) is also abstract, because the morpheme choices
indicated make up a type representation, not a token utterance. (1a)
realizes (1b), but it is still an abstract representation because the mor-
phemes indicated as the, lazy, and dog are abstract symbols standing
for any suitable realization (in that structural context). This helps clar-
ify the status of them when they are listed in (1c), abstracting away
from the structure they flesh out in (1a); here, they represent abstract
symbols for elements that only appear in a grammatical representation
(like (1a)), but are here listed as an unstructured array. They are not
exponents, phonological matrices, or semantic building blocks; they
are just symbols chosen from the lexicon of one particular natural lan-
guage. Speakers of English have one definite article notated the, unlike
the series of grammatically differentiated inflected articles of German,
for example, and abstracted from the structure in which they appear.
Their identity with orthographic words is of course purely a matter of
convenience.
To sum up: we factor out an uncontroversial representation like
(1a) into a pure structural representation (1b) and a choice of vo-
cabulary items (specific to one language) which interpret it lexically.
Both representations are abstract, but their mutual relation is one of a
specific choice of linguistic material (morphemes, lexemes) realizing a
grammatical template; this can be construed as a type-token relation,
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as we will now make precise.
4. THE NOUNS-OBJECTS INTERFACE: A HYPOTHESIS
We start from the presupposition that language and object recognition
are distinct modules of cognition, and propose a formal apparatus to
capture their relations and reciprocal constraints (Section 4.2). This
apparatus is based on Barwise & Seligman (1997)’s theory of informa-
tion flow. Before we spell it out, we motivate our choice (Section 4.1).
4.1. Motivation
Given our presupposition about language and object recognition, our
account of the relation between these two aspects of cognition is incom-
patible with a certain class of theoretical frameworks. Works within the
“Construction Grammar” programme assume that there is no distinc-
tion between the cognitive principles regulating language and other
domains (e.g. Goldberg 1995, 2006; Talmy 2000; Tomasello 2003;
Evans 2010). They would thus predict that no relations would arise be-
tween these domains, for no such distinction would be in place. Other
works do propose a distinction amongst domains (or “modules”, cf.
Fodor 1975, 1983), which are usually modeled as involving hierarchical
structures (Hauser et al. 2002; Jackendoff & Pinker 2005; Kirby 2007).
However, these works generally do not offer accounts of how the re-
lations between language and non-linguistic domains operate. Thus,
different linguistic theories converge in remaining vague about these
“interface” matters (cf. Chomsky 1995, 2001; Sadock 2012; Sag et al.
2012; Harley 2014). A partial exception is Jackendoff (2002), in which
modules processing information in parallel can involve forms of “bind-
ing” (i.e. synchronization) of their processed information.
A red thread connecting these theories is that, even when mappings
between domains are presented, their properties are not explored and
formalized in detail. Our goal in using the theory of information flow
(Barwise & Seligman 1997) is to remedy this situation, thereby showing
that the “logics” of visual objects and syntactic structures affect one an-
other in non-trivial ways.2 We have three reasons for our choice. First,
the formal apparatus that the theory offers allows us to capture cogni-
tive and linguistic aspects with ease, while previous formally oriented
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works (e.g. Gupta 1980; Lasersohn 2018) mostly focus on language
alone. Second, the formal component spells out explicit definitions of
notions such “type”, “token”, “relation”, “classification”, and so on (Bar-
wise & Seligman 1997, Ch. 2–4; cf. also Smith 1995, 2003). Third, the
system offers two precise inference systems that allow us to define what
counts as a type in both domains, and to make formally precise the no-
tions of object file, concept, nominal and kind discussed in Sections
2–3. With these clarifications in mind, we turn to the proposal.
4.2. The Apparatus
An information system can be envisioned or displayed via the logical
properties and structures that govern the types constituting this sys-
tem, and their corresponding relations. A “logic” of visual objects must
thus capture how different visual types combine to identify objects files,
in turn constituting object concepts. A “logic” of nominals must cap-
ture how different nominal grammatical types classify specific lexical
choices. The two systems or “logics” can be defined via the operations
that govern these properties, and via an infomorphism, a mapping be-
tween the two systems that govern their information exchange. Intu-
itively, we can conceive each formal system as a tool that allows us to
study object recognition and lexical interpretation as “parts” of visual
cognition and language. These two larger parts can then be conceived
as parts of cognition as a whole.
The infomorphism captures how the two systems must exchange
information for this exchange to be successful: how nominals can de-
scribe and define objects, and how visually defined objects can be la-
belled via the linguistic representations known as nominals.
We define the formal properties of each system via the compact for-
mulations in (2)–(4):
(2) A Visual Structure (VS) is a sextuple <O, *O, |=, t, u, v> con-
sisting of:
– A set of tokens O
– A set of types *O
– An instantiation relation |=
– The two operations t (join), u (meet)
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– The relation v (part-of)
(3) A Nominal Structure (NS) is a sextuple <N, *N, |=, t, u, v>
consisting of:
– A set of tokens N
– A set of types *N
– An instantiation relation |=
– The two operations t (join), u (meet)
– The relation v (part-of)
(4) Variables:
– o is a member of O (a visual token)
– *o is a member of *O (a visual type)
– n is a member of N (a nominal token)
– *n is a member of *N (a nominal type)
The two structures act as classifications or classifying structures: they
allow us to classify visual and nominal entities as combinations of to-
kens (from the sets O, N), types (from the sets *O, *N), and relations
among these types. Visual tokens can be conceived as visual stimuli
that can be interpreted as realizing visual types (e.g. red, ball and so
on). Nominal tokens are linguistic symbols without their grammatical
content. The instantiation relation “|=” represents a relation between
tokens and types. We say that a instantiates b (i.e. a |= b) when a (nom-
inal, object) token a acts as an instance of the (nominal, object) type
b. No confusion should arise regarding this symbol. Although its use
in propositional logic is to model entailment relations among proposi-
tions, in our case it establishes an “asymmetrical” relation between an
“abstract” type/ property and its “concrete” realization/ token (Barwise
& Seligman 1997, Ch. 3). Since the notation type(token) in Sections
2–3 is equivalent to this relational notation, we use it here onwards for
consistency and readability reasons.
In our formal system, object files (e.g. b=ball(x)) and nominal rep-
resentations (e.g. [the [ dog ]]) are not basic but involve the defini-
tion of complex types via the two operations t (join), u (meet) and
the relation v (part-of), introduced in Section 2. We thus assume that
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an object file can be defined as instantiating either the meet of two or
more types (e.g. red(x)usphere(x)=ball(x)), or the join of types (e.g.
red(x)tblue(x)=colour(x), in our simplified model). Portmanteau af-
fixation in the nominal domain involves the meet of nominal types:
the Italian root noun can– can be suffixed via the inflectional suffix –e,
which fuses the singular and male (gender) types (i.e. we have singu-
lar(x)ufemale(x)=can–e). Join nominal types involve a form of “ambi-
guity” (polysemy, as we discuss in Section 5). Thus, English fish is am-
biguous with respect to number (i.e. it can be singular(x)tplural(x)).
The v (part-of) relation allows us to capture type relations. For in-
stance, blue(x)vcolour(x) and singular(y)vnumber(y) model relations
between object and nominal types, respectively. To an extent, this rela-
tion captures the fact that a certain type can be “part” of a larger domain
of types, as the examples suggest. At the same time, this relation indi-
rectly suggests that object files are related to concepts as “parts” of a
complex representational structure based on a type (i.e. COLOUR in-
cluding RED and BLUE as sub-concepts). The same reasoning applies
to nominal categories and their possible declension classes (e.g. ball,
balls as specific forms of the nominal class in English).
Overall, our classification structures offer a logic that makes possible
a formal proof of what count as visual objects and nominals in the first
place. The second inference system is the infomorphism. To see how
this system works, we present a graphic representation in Fig. 1, and
explain how this representation should be read:
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Figure 1. The structure of our infomorphism.
The graphic reads as follows. The instantiation relation |=O rep-
resents a relation holding between object tokens and types; the rela-
tion |=N that between nominal tokens and types. The first instantiation
relation defines object files; the second, grammatically inflected nom-
inals. Both relations can be conceived as relations activated in short-
term memory.
We can now offer the central definition. Given our classifications
VS and NS, an infomorphism is defined as a pair of functions i=<f, g>
such that:
(5) a. f(n)|=*o if and only if n|=g(*o)
b. f establishes a mapping from N to O
c. g establishes a mapping from *O to *N
In words, f and g are symmetrical functions (mapping relations)
connecting objects and nominals. The function f maps nominal tokens
to visual tokens; the g function maps visual types to nominal types.
Thus, the general equations f(n)=o and g(*O)=*N hold (cf. Barwise
& Seligman 1997, Ch. 3). These general equations are represented as
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the diagonal lines connecting tokens from one system to types of the
other system. At the level of files and nominals, an infomorphism i es-
tablishes an indirect relation inferred from g and f. The infomorphism
represents the fact that these two entities are related, but the precise re-
lations between constituting tokens and types become opaque. A clear
consequence, fully discussed in Section 5, is that the correspondence
between nominals and files, and therefore concepts and kinds, does
not involve nouns or nominal structures of a specific “size”. The equa-
tions i(file) = nominal and i(CONCEPT) = kind thus represent these
indirect, “horizontal” mappings, in which concepts indirectly constrain
kinds and vice versa. The same reasoning applies to files and nominals,
given this mapping.
5. THE INTERFACE: A THEORY OF INFORMATION FLOW
This section articulates the consequences of the formalization just pro-
posed. The two functions posited between the visual and the linguistic
domain constitute a map that is systematic but indirect, which is em-
pirically correct (Section 5.1). The most instructive cases, and those
which most clearly demonstrate the empirical success of our proposal,
are those involving non-defined and zero values (Sections 5.2 and 5.3
respectively).
5.1. The virtues of an indirect mapping
Our hypothesis is centered on the assumption that the visual and nomi-
nal domains are connected via a homomorphism, a “many-to-one” map-
ping (Landman 1991, Ch. 2; Barwise & Seligman 1997, Ch. 2). This
simple formal aspect of our hypothesis already entails two important
empirical consequences.
Recall that, first, we have the mapping f(n)=o, with n a variable
over lexical material (words or morphemes), and o a variable over vi-
sual stimuli; and second, the mapping g(*o)=*n, with *o a variable
over visual types, and *n a variable over linguistic types. Since the
function f is many-to-one, it can map several alternative lexical choices
over a visual stimulus (i.e. name an object in different ways, e.g. ball
vs. sphere), which is obviously the desired result: a visual experience
does not dictate a unique choice of words that describe it. Likewise,
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the function g can map different visual features (e.g. being spherical,
being blue) to a single grammatical structure, which again is the de-
sired result. One grammatical nominal structure can underlie the de-
scription of many different visual features. That visual and linguistic
objects clearly do not deterministically select each other is so obvious
that it obscures the fact that our system derives it while still establish-
ing a precise relation between the visual and the linguistic system. The
infomorphism depicted in Fig. 1 achieves this result because the two
functions f and g directly connect only visual tokens to grammatical
structures and, respectively, lexical tokens to visual types (features). In
both domains, an object is defined as a type-token map, but there is no
direct connection between objects as thus defined. The only “global”
connection between them is represented by the composite function i,
which is defined as the pair of functions <f,g>. This indirect formal
link ensures that concepts abstracted from visual object files and kinds
associated to linguistic nominal representations are related, avoiding
the pitfall of making visual and linguistic representations directly de-
pendent on one another. At the same time, the infomorphism is flexible
but far from vacuous: a visual input (token) categorized by the features
(type) BLUEuBALL can never be related to a choice of lexical material
(token) red and ball.
To see this, let n stand for the lexical array {red, ball}, and the meet
type BLUEuBALL for the visual type *o. By hypothesis, n does not in-
stantiate g(*o); that is, {red, ball} does not instantiate the grammatical
template [Adjective [Noun]] which is related by function g to the type
BLUEuBALL (g(*o)). Since it is not the case that n|=g(*o), (5a) says
that f(n)|=*o will not hold either, that is, the function f will not map
{red, ball} to a visual stimulus that instantiates the *o type BLUEuBALL.
In other words, no matter how we characterize the visual type notated
BLUEuBALL, if it is not what language expresses by the words {red,
ball}, then those words cannot be part of a linguistic description of the
visual stimulus categorized as BLUEuBALL. The fact that visual types
must be labelled verbally, like BLUE, might raise the suspicion that we
are trivially stating that what is “red” cannot be “blue”. Not so: the
nature of visual types is established vision-internally. Still, our system
is not vacuous because it rules out a connection between a nominal and
a visual object, unless the functions f and g ensure that a token of one
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domain can instantiate a type in the other.
The infomorphism defined between the two domains, however, is
not just empirically adequate, but also revealing, since it derives cor-
rect results that would not be immediately obvious. To see this, we
first discuss cases involving undefined and null values for variables and
types (Sections 5.2–5.3). We then discuss how “regular” values can in-
fluence the emergence of well-known phenomena, such as prototype
effects, polysemy and relativism (Section 6).
5.2. Undefined values
Let us consider cases in which tokens and types take an undefined value,
represented as “⊥”. At a pre-theoretical level, this is true in two cases:
a token/ type not being previously defined. The first is when tokens
do not act as the minimal units in either domain (e.g. visual stimuli
not being spatio-temporally discrete, lexical entries being novel). The
second is when types are not identified that can determine how the
instantiation process occurs (e.g. visual stimuli having a novel, not
previously defined shape, nominals lacking inflectional morphology).
At a token level, we can have undefined tokens o (objects) or n
(nominals). In the first case, the relation (⊥ |=*o)=⊥ holds: a visual
token is undefined, so it cannot instantiate a visual type. However, the
function f can still map a linguistic token onto this undefined visual type
(that is, f(n)|=*o holds). Conversely, the function n|=g(*o) is defined,
and connects nominal tokens and visual types.
This set of relations proves that undefined visual stimuli can still be
named via fully formed lexical choices, and via these, it can be estab-
lished that they are related to visual types. In other words, we predict
that we can have nouns for novel objects; that is, nouns whose content
is still not defined (e.g. dax, Landau et al. 1988, 1992). We also predict
that nouns failing to define any content can become part of a nominal
system. Forms like contents, beginnings, furnishings are true of objects
in a particular (often contingent) spatiotemporal configuration or used
for a particular function. However, they do not describe what these ob-
jects are in terms of kind instances, even though the plural entails that
they make up a collection: with contents, for example, we only know
that there are entities that are contingently contained, without specify-
ing the kinds they instantiate (Wierzbicka 1988; Acquaviva 2018).
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When a nominal token is undefined instead (that is, we have (⊥
|=*n)), a nominal describing an object file is also missing (i.e. we have
(f(⊥) |= *o)= ⊥). But a token-type relation can be defined in the vi-
sual system (i.e. we have o|=*o), and with it a mapping between types
(g(*o)=*n). We thus have a proof that not only are non-verbalized vi-
sual objects possible, but also that speakers know what grammatical
template would be the appropriate one to describe them, if there were
the words to describe them. This is what makes novel words possible,
for instance when we know that an as-yet undefined property (“having
that particular look”, say) would be an adjective if it was part of the
shared vocabulary.
A similar pattern occurs with types. If a visual token that does in-
stantiate a well-defined type (i.e. we have o|= ⊥)= ⊥), it cannot have
a nominal to describe it (i.e. we have (f(n)|=⊥)=⊥). The same holds
for the function g (i.e. we have n|=g(⊥))= ⊥). The significant con-
clusion, formally entailed, is that a visual stimulus cannot be named
directly, bypassing its categorization in terms of type, since it does not
license the definition of an object file.
Correspondingly, a nominal token not instantiating a nominal type
(i.e. (n|= ⊥)= ⊥) cannot serve as a basis for constructing a nominal
phrase that describes a visual object. If the token-type instantiation on
the linguistic side is undefined, the function g cannot relate a visual type
*o to a missing linguistic type (i.e. (n|=g(*o))= ⊥). This entails that
no type-less nominal can name objects, since it is not well-formed (e.g.
a root without inflectional morphology, as would be a hypothetical un-
inflected gatt– in a language like Italian). Only fully formed nouns can
act as lexical choices which can be related to object files. For the linguis-
tic as well as for the visual domain, then, non-categorized tokens exist,
but categorization (that is, an instantiation relation to a type) becomes
indispensable for any kind of relation between the two domains.
5.3. Null values
A different picture emerges when tokens and types involve a null value,
which we denote as “∅”. We distinguish this value from the undefined
value because the null value represents the lack of specific information,
rather than the impossibility of defining such a value. For instance, an
agent can represent a transparent object as an object lacking a colour
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type (i.e. we have colour: ∅), or a hole as an object having an empty
value for the shape type. An agent who has not experienced a blue
colour, however, will represent this first instance as a yet-to-be-defined
colour (i.e. “⊥”). The relevant cases are defined as follows.
If a visual token has an empty value, it can nevertheless instantiate a
type (i.e. ∅ |=*o). The corresponding object file can be described via a
nominal (i.e. we have f(n)|=*o, n|=g(*o)). If a visual type corresponds
to the empty value (i.e. o|=*∅), a similar reasoning holds, but with
two slightly different consequences. One can have “null” object files,
and therefore concepts, defined via the meet of opposing types (e.g.
sphere(x)ucube(x) as the type of a “spherical cube”). Thus, no object
concept can be defined and named as an “impossible” object (see Ac-
quaviva & Panagiotidis 2012). One can also have objects instantiating
null types for a given sub-domain, holes in doughnuts being examples
(cf. Casati & Varzi 1994). In both cases, the system predicts that the
lack of specific information about visual objects, at a token or type level,
entails different solutions emerging on how these empty objects can be
named.
When nominal tokens and types involve null values, two slightly
different patterns emerge. When nominal tokens are “empty” (that is
∅ |=*n), a nominal lacks a specific meaning in a language, even though
it can name an object (i.e. we have f(∅)|=*o,∅ |=g(*o)). Thus, English
may not include the noun paccheri as a noun for a certain pasta shape.
However, this noun can be introduced and used in this language to
signal this information, even when a speaker explicitly signals that it is
not part of his or her current lexicon (e.g. this is known as “pacchero” in
Italian). If a nominal type is null (i.e. n|=*∅ holds), it can nevertheless
describe an object (that is, f(n)|=*o, n|=g(*o)). One can thus have
nouns (or pronouns) that involve a neutral or null distinction along
a certain grammatical dimension, for instance the neuter of Spanish
esto/eso/aquello ‘this/that’, which is neither masculine nor feminine,
and does not enter in the agreement relations of the two gender values
(Ledgeway 2012, p. 106). Our system thus leads us to posit (again,
correctly) that what counts as null may also be a grammatical category
value, not just a lexical choice.
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6. THE INTERFACE: EMERGING COMPLEX PATTERNS
We now discuss three phenomena that involve complex relations be-
tween linguistic and visual objects: prototype effects (Section 6.1),
noun polysemy (Section 6.2), and phenomena related to the “Sapir-
Whorf” hypothesis (Section 6.3).
6.1. Prototype theory
Our infomorphism hypothesis offers a way to model the notion of pro-
totype in a relatively streamlined manner. Prototype theory proposes
that a prototype is a central concept in a corresponding concept class
(Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978). A classic example is that an agent can have
the concept ROBIN to act as the prototypical concept for the BIRD con-
cept class. This is the case when an agent identifies the properties of a
robin with the prototypical properties of bird, and possibly associates
other BIRD concepts with less prototypical statuses. This occurs when
a given concept only has some of the properties identifying a prototyp-
ical concept: the less ample the set of attested properties is, the less
prototypical a concept will be. Prototype theory thus takes a flexible
approach to category/ class membership, compared to traditional anal-
yses of concepts (cf. Gärdenfors 2000, Ch. 2, 2004; Murphy 2002).
Our account resembles the proposals offered in Formal Concept Anal-
ysis (Ganter & Wille 2005; Ganter et al. 2005). We treat BIRD as a
concept involving (representations of) objects that can instantiate the
complex types “‘lays eggs, can fly, has feathers”’ (cf. Van Eijck & Zwarts
2004, 2). We use partial descriptions for visual properties: “lays eggs”
and “can fly” can be conceived as affordances. They capture properties
that agents can observe in birds in certain environments, and permit
agents to interact with birds (e.g. collect eggs as food). From these
properties/ visual types, an agent can develop the BIRD concept over
the course of multiple observational events. For each event, an object
file formalized as bird = lays-eggs(x)ucan-fly(x)uhas-feathers(x) can be
instantiated; from multiple files, the concept BIRD is formed. An agent
usually observing robins as the most common bird species will likely
develop the identity BIRD = ROBIN in long-term memory. Under this
view, a prototype concept is a concept acting proxy for a super-concept
identifying a class, in this case robins for birds, which is the most com-
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mon in an environment.3
The infomorphism can subsequently establish a relation between
nouns for kinds, prototypes and nouns for non-prototypical concepts.
In our formulation, the nominal robin names this prototype (i.e. we
have g(robin) = lays-eggs(x)ucan-fly(x)uhas-feathers(x)). Conversely,
less prototypical files can be represented as only including part of these
types. An agent may observe a penguin as a bird that lacks feathers, and
form the object file penguin = can-fly(y)ulays-eggs(y) from which the
PENGUIN concept is formed. Penguin becomes the nominal that names
this “partial” BIRD concept (i.e. we have g(penguin) = can-fly(y)ulays-
eggs(y)). Our hypothesis can then capture that PENGUIN is a less pro-
totypical BIRD concept than ROBIN via the part-of relation. The con-
cept PENGUIN is part of the concept BIRD, because the relation can-
fly(y)ulays-eggs(y)vcan-fly(t)ulays-eggs(t)uhas-feathers(t) holds. Since
BIRD is formed via the concept ROBIN and defines the “whole” set of
types identifying birds as visual objects, any other bird concept that is
formed via only a part of these types will be less prototypical (i.e. we
have PENGUINvROBIN, which reads: a PENGUIN concept is less proto-
typical than a ROBIN concept.
A prediction that emerges from our hypothesis is that agents/ speak-
ers can understand hyponym relations between nouns (e.g. “a robin is
a type/kind of bird”) as relations between the concepts they are related
to (Murphy 2010, Ch. 4; Riemer 2010, Ch. 5). A second, subtler pre-
diction is that no precise relation is established between the types from
which a concept arises and the nominal types. Therefore, speakers and
speakers’ communities may use different nominals to capture this re-
lation. Australians may develop the prototypical identity PARROT =
BIRD, and reason about bird prototypes by using parrots as prototypes,
since parrots are more common in this country. A third prediction is that
the kinds that nouns denote can also display prototype properties, by
being mapped onto concepts. An agent who has ROBIN as a prototype
concept for BIRD will offer robin as a name for a prototypical bird, since
it denotes the kind associated to this concept (i.e. we have i(robin) =
ROBIN = BIRD). Thus, our hypothesis reconstructs the central aspects
of prototype theory in a compact manner.
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6.2. Noun polysemy
Polysemy holds when a vocabulary item has when it covers distinct but
related senses (Kearns 2006; Murphy 2010, Ch. 4). For instance, ball
has subtly distinct senses, depending on whether one talks about rugby
balls, tennis balls, or other types of objects that may not even be used in
sports. Some cognitively oriented theories propose that concepts and
word meanings/ senses are clearly distinct, although polysemy reflects
conceptual structures (e.g. Tyler & Evans 2003; Evans 2009, 2010,
2015). Other theories do not distinguish the two levels; hence, they
model polysemy as a property of concepts (Murphy 2002; Carey 2009).
Since we model concepts and meanings/ kinds as distinct mental enti-
ties, here we follow the first approach to polysemy.
Model-Theoretic frameworks studying polysemy (e.g. Pustejovsky
1995, 2013; Asher 2011) suggest that polysemous vocabulary items can
carry multiple sense types. These determine the possible senses of an
item and its semantic relations with other items. The polysemy of ball
can modeled as involving the sense of this item (i.e. ball(x)), being part
of at least the types gender and number. While ball is a noun carrying
a singular sub-type (i.e. the hyponymy relation singular(x)vnumber(x)
holds), it is ambiguous (i.e. polysemous) with respect to the gender
type. Ball can also be considered polysemous with respect to informa-
tion regarding shape; it can be restricted via the adjectives oval, spher-
ical and so on.
We can represent this fact by representing distinct sense sub-types
as hyponyms of a sense super-type (e.g. oval(x)vball(t) and spheri-
cal(y)vball(t)). A type (e.g. oval) can be defined as a hyponym/ sub-
kind/ sub-type of another type (e.g. ball) if a token belonging to the
first type also belongs to the second type (i.e. oval(x)vball(t)). The set
of possible hyponyms of a noun can be represented as a join set (i.e. we
have oval(x)tspherical(y)tball(t)). The part-of relation can be used to
represent lexical/ semantic relations, when it holds among nouns and
the kinds they denote (cf. Murphy 2010, Ch. 4; Asher 2011, Ch. 5).
The second proof system, the infomorphism, can shed light on how
polysemous nouns are related to concepts. In our account, concepts
also involve a form of “ambiguity”. For instance, the BALL concept can
involve the union several visual types that can define its SHAPE range.
Our hypothesis predicts, however, that no type symmetry is necessary
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between types of concepts and kinds. To see why this is the case, con-
sider the mapping g(ball)=ball′ that can be established between nomi-
nal and visual types, with ball′(x) a noun type. We have established that
ball′ can be polysemous with respect to shape (i.e. ball(x) can stand for
oval(x) or spherical(x)). Hence, the nominal type ball′(x) can name the
visual type spherical(z) (i.e. g(spherical(z))=ball′(x) holds).
Once this and the token mapping f(x)=y are established, one can
infer that a noun can describe a given object file. The indirect inference
that the concept including this file and the corresponding kind are re-
lated can then be established (i.e. we have i(ball)=BALL). This mapping
indirectly predicts that two types of asymmetry can arise. First, one can
have a richer representation for noun types than for visual types. For
instance, a speaker can use a potentially polysemous noun (here, ball)
to describe an object with a specific function but not shape. Proto-
type effects may occur, too. Australian speakers may conceive ball as
typically describing oval balls, because of the popularity of rugby and
Australian Rules football codes; British speakers may prefer spherical
balls because of football. However, rugby balls are often called ovali
or ovales respectively in Italy and France; nouns pallone and balon are
mostly reserved for Football (spherical balls). Our hypothesis predicts
that such asymmetries can be systematic, once one looks beyond a given
language to study the relation between the two systems via the lenses
of our infomorphism.
6.3. Relativism vs. Universalism
The debate on the relation between language and cognition has wit-
nessed a renewed interest over the three last decades. Recent liter-
ature suggests that strong versions of the hypothesis (“language de-
termines cognition”) but also strong Universalist positions (“cognition
affects language”) are untenable (Casasanto 2008, 2016). Here we
(briefly) discuss how the infomorphism hypothesis is consistent with
recent findings suggesting that an intermediate, “dynamic” relation be-
tween cognition and language is empirically adequate. Hence, we focus
on works investigating this hypothesis in the domain of colour, qua a
sub-domain of visual cognition that is partitioned via nouns or adjec-
tives across languages (Berlin & Kay 1969; Kay & Maffi 1999).
Most works on the emergence of colour names investigate how speak-
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ers of a given language can use words (lexical choices, in our terms) to
distinguish possible non-linguistic concepts. Languages may partition
the “colour” conceptual space according to a semantic/ lexical implica-
tional hierarchy. If a language has a colour distinction at all, then it will
distinguish between “black” and “white”, or more accurately absence vs.
presence of light. If the language distinguishes further colours, then it
will distinguish between “red” and “green/ blue”. Further distinctions
can emerge, but always follow this hierarchy. These distinctions mirror
basic visual mechanisms that organize humans’ partition of the colour
conceptual space (e.g. the distinction between DARK vs. LIGHT colour
concepts).
Research on Papua New Guinean language Berinmo, however, found
that this language creates a different partition than English when the
yellow and green colours are involved. Speakers of this language have
different terms from English for these colours, and thus label as “yel-
low” objects that would be labelled “green” in English (Roberson et al.
2002). This exception has been taken as initial evidence that the univer-
sal colour hierarchy may not be universal, after all. Subsequent works
have investigated colour-naming across a much broader language sam-
ple (Regier et al. 2010; Regier et al. 2015). A general pattern emerging
is that there seems to be a trade-off between polysemy, term specificity
and communicative efficiency. Languages may have few terms to name
colours, and these terms may be highly polysemous (e.g. Iduna, an-
other Papuan language: Regier et al. 2015). Languages with richer
inventories involve more efficient communication in context, but also a
need to memorize a wider set of terms and the way they partition this
semantic space (Kemp et al. 2018; Zaslavsky et al. 2018).
Our hypothesis is consistent with these results: it predicts that nom-
inals for colours can be polysemous, and need not to name the same
concepts across languages. An example of this latter prediction is the
following. Across languages, the “blue” and “green” colours are some-
times named via the same nominal, one example being the Vietnamese
xanh (Berlin & Kay 1969). In our approach, this nominal can be used
to describe an object instantiating either a BLUE or a GREEN visual con-
cept, or simply the join concept BLUEtGREEN. This naming relation can
be represented via the mapping g(xanh(x))=green(x)tblue(x)). What
a Vietnamese speaker knows, according to our hypothesis, is not that
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BLUE and GREEN are the same concept, but that this language lacks
a distinct nominal for them, and that this nominal is ambiguous (i.e.
polysemous) when used in context.
An English speaker, on the other hand, knows that green and blue
are nominals (adjectives) that name the two distinct concepts. How-
ever, both types of speakers can develop BLUE and GREEN concepts, for
these concepts represent visual distinctions independent of language.
Our hypothesis can account for different naming patterns, relative to a
language, because it models nouns as potentially labelling any concept
combination. This fact can be captured by also assuming that NS, the
nominal structure, is indexed with respect to a language. Thus, the in-
fomorphism between NSEnglish and VS, and NSVietnamese and VS are not,
and need not be, isomorphic. Languages can partition the conceptual
space of colour, among others, in ways that can be modeled via our in-
fomorphism, but that can vary in a subtle but logical manner. With this
point in mind, we move to the conclusions.
7. CONCLUSION
The analysis articulated in the preceding sections is a specific hypoth-
esis about the relation between language and vision, or more precisely
about the relation between the linguistic and the visual conceptualiza-
tion of objects. We have seen the independent motivations for viewing
the two, respectively, as maps of stimuli to visual features, and as lex-
ically interpreted grammatical representations. We have seen how the
two can be reinterpreted in terms of type-token maps, which in turn
allows for a formalization of their interrelation as an infomorphism,
with two functions defined over token and type variables from both
domains. Finally, we have shown that the formal system thus defined
proves, as necessary inferences, a number of facts about the relation
between nominally– and visually–defined objects, fitting the empirical
observation in a predictive way. Taking a step back, we conclude with
some higher-level observations to place the analysis just summarized in
its correct light.
The ever-present risk of surreptitiously identifying the structure of
non-linguistic conceptual knowledge with the structure defined by the
words of one particular language has been a constant concern, clearly
Vol. 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language
29 Francesco-Alessio Ursini & Paolo Acquaviva
stated at the outset (Section 1). We have avoided the vicious circle of
identifying mental content with the content of linguistic signs because
the visual features (types) we use, labelled by capital words, correspond
to natural language words just for convenience. The visual type repre-
sented as blue does not equal the content of the English word “blue”,
but is a symbol for a posited visual feature, understood as a property
whose existence is justified by an account of vision. If it turns out that
no such property is justified, then blue is no longer one of the visual
features – with no consequence on the theory we have outlined, which
is independent of the identity of each feature.
If language does not shape the basic ingredients of vision, the op-
posite is not true either. The discussion in Section 6.3 has shown why
our results are incompatible with a strong Whorfian relativism; but that
does not mean that language is irrelevant in shaping conceptual knowl-
edge. Our position, in common with much work in the “constructionist”
approach to grammar and lexical word classes, is that linguistic repre-
sentations structure very basic conceptual ingredients, like the notions
of individuality, boundedness, continuity, numerosity, divisibility, cu-
mulativity, and, for verbal semantics, the notions of process, culmina-
tion, boundary, initiation, possibly also causation in some sense (see
Ramchand 2011 for discussion). These, like other notions, often mod-
eled by the help of mathematical tools, are presupposed ingredients
in the linguistic construction of complex representations; but they do
not “explain away” language, any more than they explain away vision.
Specifically, the particular contribution of language lies in embedding
and combining this basic information into symbols of arbitrary com-
plexity (Spelke 2003; Acquaviva 2018).
Two final observations concern more specific aspects of our analysis.
First, we distinguished sharply (Sections 5.2, 5.3) undefined from null
values for the functions of the infomorphism: in the former there is no
categorizing between a token and a type, in the latter there is, but with
a (token or type) null value. This is not trivial, because it presupposes
a specific perspective on the question of “empty” mental representa-
tions (see Rey 2005 for discussion). In our internalist approach, there
is no problem in positing such empty mental representations, even on
logically necessary grounds, as long as they have a function to per-
form – for instance representing the content of an unknown noun. Our
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system thus makes a distinction between two senses in which a repre-
sentation can be empty, which may be lumped together in a different
perspective. Secondly, categorization and the classification of token el-
ements as instances of a type has been the centre of our analysis. In
our approach, categorization is fundamental not only because it un-
derpins cognition in different domains (like vision), independently of
language, but also because it plays a role in establishing the necessary
connections between domains. Not only do we subscribe to the con-
clusion that “to cognize is to categorize” (Harnad 2005); insofar as our
hypothesis about the language-vision relation is correct, we also offer
a way to prove it.
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Notes
1Meet and join are associative, idempotent and commutative operations. These aspects
are not crucial to our discussion, so we do not discuss them further.
2Barwise & Seligman (1997, Ch. 2) presents this hypothesis as externalist-oriented,
for they mostly analyze physical (i.e. mind-external) systems such as switchboxes. The
internalist or externalist (or both) nature of the theory is thus reduced to its use: by
applying this theory to mind-internal matters, we present an internalist application of
the theory.
3Prototype theory includes a supplementary layer of complexity: a super-ordinate
concept such as BIRD acts as the PROTOTYPE concept, in the absence of other concepts
that can become preponderant in concept formation. The emergence of a prototype cor-
responds to the emergence of the pair of identities ROBIN = PROTOTYPE and BIRD =
PROTOTYPE, i.e. to a subordinate concept being as prototypical as the super-ordinate
concept. Nothing crucial hinges on this simplification.
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